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THE CASE FOR CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
SANCTIONS IN QUEENSLAND’S RACIAL 
VILIFICATION LEGISLATION 
 
By Ben White*  
 
Introduction 
 
Queensland does not have effective racial vilification legislation. Its only provision related to hate 
speech, s126 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), is poorly drafted and places an onerous 
burden of proof on the complainant. It has been described as "effectively useless".1 If Queensland is 
going to address the issue of racial vilification, then its hate speech provisions must be improved. 
 
One crucial reform issue is the type of sanctions that should be used to fight hate speech. The major 
dispute is whether racial vilification legislation should create civil prohibitions or criminal offences or 
both. This dispute was illustrated when the Commonwealth Government attempted to pass its Racial 
Hatred Bill 1995 (Cth). The civil prohibitions were accepted but there was strong opposition to the 
creation of any criminal offences. As a result, the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) did not contain any 
criminal sanctions.  
 
This paper argues that Queensland must enact both criminal and civil sanctions. It examines their 
different roles and asserts that both are needed to combat racial vilification effectively. It does this in 
four parts. 
 
Part 1 sets the scene by briefly outlining the racial vilification legislation in Australia. It gives an 
overview of the legislation of the Commonwealth, Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian 
Capital Territory, South Australia and Western Australia. 
 
Part 2 explains the rationale for using civil sanctions to combat racial vilification. It advocates that any 
civil redress should be through the discrimination law remedies available under the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). This part highlights the strengths of such remedies and focuses 
particularly on their victim orientation. It also addresses any weaknesses of the civil sanctions. 
 
Part 3 justifies the criminalisation of racial vilification by examining the role that criminal sanctions 
would play in combating hate speech. It focuses on their strong public statement of condemnation as 
well as their protective function. It also considers some of the flaws that are perceived in 
criminalisation. 
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1 John Briton (Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commissioner) The Courier Mail 2/10/96 at 8 and The Courier Mail 
1/11/96 at 7. 
Finally, Part 4 examines how the partnership between these two very different sanctions would work. 
It explains why the discrimination law remedies should play the dominant role, with criminal 
sanctions being appropriate only in certain limited situations. 
 
Part 1: Current Legislation2 
 
1.1 The Commonwealth 
 
The Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) amended the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) to prohibit 
racial vilification.3 The Commonwealth Government struggled to pass this legislation as it was 
opposed primarily on the ground that it would restrict the freedom of speech.4 The result was that the 
Act did not include criminal sanctions and created only discrimination law remedies. 
 
Section 18C(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) prohibits any racially motivated act, done 
otherwise than in private, that is “reasonably likely” to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate. Section 
18C(2) provides that any act will not be done in private if it is done in a public place, within the sight 
or hearing of people in a public place or causes communication to the public.5 Section 18B facilitates 
proof of racial vilification by providing that the motivation for “doing an act” does not have to be a 
dominant or even substantial reason so long as it is a reason. 
 
Section 18D contains very broad exemptions6 for acts said or done reasonably and in good faith: 
• for artistic purposes; 
• in the course of a debate or discussion for academic, artistic or scientific purposes or for any other 
genuine purpose in the public interest; 
• to fairly and accurately report matters of public interest; or 
• to make fair comment if the comment is genuinely believed.  
 
Section 18F preserves the operation of State and Territory laws and shows that the Commonwealth 
does not intend to cover the field in relation to racial vilification. This means that Queensland’s 
legislation can coexist provided that it is not directly inconsistent with the Commonwealth Act.7 
This means that Queensland will be able to legally criminalise racial vilification even though the 
Commonwealth Act has not done so. Further, Queensland may validly introduce different, but not 
inconsistent, discrimination law remedies. 
 
                                            
2 The focus of this section is on whether the current Australian legislation has civil or criminal sanctions or both. It is 
not a general outline of what the legislation contains. Note also that draft legislation was tabled in the Victorian 
Parliament in 1992 but it lapsed with the election of a Liberal Government. 
3 The Commonwealth relied on its external affairs power using the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 4 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 20(2). 
4 The original Racial Discrimination Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) lapsed and the Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) was 
heavily amended by the Senate. 
5 Section 18C(3) further defines “public place” as including “any place to which the public have access as of right or by 
invitation, whether express or implied and whether or not a charge is made for admission to the place.” 
6 These exemptions have been criticised as being too wide and also as being too focused on “neighbourhood racism” rather 
than public vilification. (John Briton 2/10/96 supra n.1) 
7 s109 Constitution 1900 (Cth). 
1.2 Queensland 
 
Queensland, like the Commonwealth, only has discrimination law remedies and does not criminalise 
hate speech. However, racial vilification is not even specifically unlawful under Queensland law. All 
that s126 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) does is create a limited prohibition on inciting 
unlawful discrimination or another contravention of the Act through advocating racial or religious 
hatred. Although s126 focuses on preventing the Act being breached rather than stopping vilification, 
extreme cases of racial hatred may still fall within the section. 
 
The major problem with s126 is that its drafting makes it “effectively useless” because it creates an 
incredibly high onus of proof.8 The complainant must prove not only that racial hatred was advocated 
but also that the hatred had a causal effect in inciting others to commit hate-inspired offences.9 
Because of this extraordinary onus of proof, there has never been a successful s126 complaint since 
the section was introduced in 1992.10  
 
This has meant that the Anti-Discrimination Commission has been unable to pursue any vilification 
complaints.11 The Queensland Government has been called upon to strengthen its stance against racial 
vilification but as of yet has not taken any steps to do so.12 
 
1.3 New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory 
 
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)13 and the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) contain 
virtually identical racial vilification provisions.14 These Acts create both civil and criminal 
sanctions. Because of this, they provide a useful model for the drafting of any proposed 
Queensland legislation.  
 
Section 20C(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)15 creates discrimination law remedies 
and makes it unlawful for a person, by a public act, to “incite hatred towards, serious contempt for 
or severe ridicule of” another because of their race. Section 20C(2)16 creates exemptions similar to 
those in the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth).  
 
Section 20D17 creates criminal sanctions for more “serious racial vilification”.18 Threatening 
physical harm towards property or persons or inciting others to make such threats are examples of 
more serious vilification. 
                                            
8 John Briton 2/10/96 and 1/11/96 supra n.1. 
9 Ibid. 
10 John Briton 2/10/96 supra n.1. 
11 Ibid. 
12 John Briton 1/11/96 supra n.1. 
13 As amended by the Anti-Discrimination (Racial Vilification) Act 1989 (NSW). 
14 The focus of this section is on the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) with the corresponding provision of the 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) being referred to in the footnotes. 
15 s66(1) Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). 
16 s66(2) Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). 
17 s67 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). 
18 Prosecution of these offences requires the Attorney-General’s consent. (s20D(2)) Any serious racial vilification that 
is complained of to the Anti-Discrimination Board must also be referred to the Attorney-General. (s89B) 
 
Both s20C and s20D require that the vilification be done by a public act. Section 20B19 defines 
“public act” broadly including communications to the public, any conduct observable by the 
public or any dissemination of any matter to the public knowing that matter expresses racial 
vilification. 
 
1.4 South Australia 
 
The most recent Australian hate speech legislation is the Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA). It also 
creates both criminal and civil sanctions. Section 4 creates the criminal offence of racial vilification 
which is very similar to s20D of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). Under s5, prosecution of 
this offence requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
 
Section 6 is unique in Australia in that it makes specific provision for an award of damages up to $40 
000 in favour of any person vilified or in the case of a vilified group, an organisation formed to further 
the interests of that group.  
 
Section 7 of the Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) also creates civil remedies by inserting s37 into the 
Wrongs Act 1936 (SA). These remedies are also unique in that they are available in tort law and not 
under discrimination law.20 
 
The actionable tort is an “act of racial victimisation that results in detriment”. An “act of racial 
victimisation” is defined in s37(1) in similar terms to the civil sanction created by s20C of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). However, excluded from the definition of the tort is:21 
• publication of a fair report of another person’s act; 
• publication of material where that publication would be absolutely privileged in a defamation 
action; or 
• a reasonable act, done in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes, or for 
other purposes in the public interest. 
 
Section 37(1) also defines “detriment” which means “injury, damage or loss” or “distress in the nature 
of intimidation, harassment or humiliation”. As with the criminal sanctions, damages are available to 
the victims of racial victimisation up to a limit of $40 000.22 To prevent “double dipping”, both s37(5) 
of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) and s6(4) of the Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA) require that any 
award of damages made must take into account any damages previously awarded. 
 
1.5 Western Australia 
 
Western Australia’s response to the racial vilification issue is unusual as it has enacted only criminal 
sanctions. The most serious offences are contained in s77 and s78 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA). 
Section 77 makes it an offence to possess threatening or abusive material intended to be published or 
displayed. The person must also intend to create or promote racial hatred by publishing that material. 
                                            
19 s65 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT). 
20 s37(2) Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA). 
21 s37(1) Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA). 
22 ss37(3) and (4) Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA). 
Section 78 creates an offence for the actual publication or display of that material with the same 
intention. 
 
Sections 79 and 80 create less serious offences for possession and display of such material 
respectively. They apply when the person intends only to harass a racial group. Under s76, the 
definitions of terms such as “display” and “publish” make it clear that all of the vilification offences 
must be to the public or to a section of the public. 
 
Part 2: Rationale for Creating Civil Sanctions for Racial Vilification 
in Queensland 
 
2.1 Victim Orientation of Discrimination Law Remedies23 
 
The law is often criticised for failing to recognise the needs of people who seek its help. Reasons 
for this include the law’s technical language, its inflexibility and the lack of control over the final 
resolution of the dispute. However, discrimination law is a lot more flexible than other forms of 
legal redress. This enables it to provide the best solutions for victims of vilification.24  
 
The first and most common form of discrimination law dispute resolution employed by the 
Queensland Anti-Discrimination Commission is conciliation.25 This involves a member of the 
Commission discussing the complaint with the parties with the goal of reaching an agreement that 
would comply with Queensland’s racial vilification legislation. Conciliation is victim oriented 
because it enables the victim to be involved in their own resolution process. It allows them to 
negotiate to protect what is important to them and it also facilitates ownership of the final 
agreement.26 Conciliation is also victim orientated because the content of the conciliated 
agreement is not limited to traditional legal remedies.27 The parties are free to decide whatever 
they want and to agree to any conditions they choose provided they comply with the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). Finally, conciliation does not place the burden of proving the rigid 
elements of a criminal offence or tort action on a victim.28 
 
If attempts to conciliate the complaint fail or the matter is inappropriate for conciliation, the next 
step under discrimination law is to be referred to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal.29 Again, 
                                            
23 Criminal sanctions, as opposed to civil remedies, are less victim oriented and this is often cited to support the use of 
discrimination law remedies. While this is true, this criticism falsely assumes that the two types of sanctions cannot be 
used together. (This criticism is explored further in Parts 3 and 4.) Despite that, this paper still does use the helpful 
comparison with criminal sanctions to highlight some of the strengths of discrimination law remedies. 
24 Not all aspects of discrimination law remedies have a victim orientation. For example, they may use a reasonable 
person test rather than considering the actual subjective reaction of the victim. (Explanatory Memorandum to Racial 
Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth)) 
25 Under s158 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), if the Commissioner believes that a complaint may be 
resolved by conciliation, then the parties must try to resolve it in that way.  
26 L McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ (1995) 4 Griffith Law Review 29 at 54; N 
Hennessy & P Smith ‘Have We Got it Right? NSW Racial Vilification Laws Five Years On’ (1994) 1 AJHR 249 at 
259-60; Explanatory Memorandum to Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth). 
27 M Jones ‘Empowering Victims of Racial Hatred by Outlawing Spirit Murder’ (1994) 1 AJHR at 316-7. 
28 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 54. 
29 ss165 - 167 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
victim orientation is a strength of this Tribunal because although it is more coercive than 
conciliation, it is still more flexible than other criminal or civil courts. For example, the Tribunal 
is not bound by the rules of evidence,30 it can inform itself on any matter it considers appropriate31 
and it must “act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case 
without regard to technicalities and legal forms”.32 This flexibility is also reflected in the remedies 
that the Tribunal can award.33 Under s209 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), the Tribunal 
can prohibit future contravention of the Act, make an order for compensation or void an 
agreement made in connection with a contravention of the Act. It can also order that the 
respondent do specified things to redress loss or damage suffered by the complainant34 such as 
make an apology35 or implement a policy to eliminate vilification.36 
 
These two discrimination law remedies are also more responsive to victims because they make it 
easier for victims to “ask the law for help.”37 It is less onerous to make a complaint to the Anti-
Discrimination Commission than it is to instigate the litigation required for other civil actions. 
Discrimination law remedies are also less threatening as the focus is on agreement through 
conciliation rather than litigation and its adversarial nature. In addition, they are less expensive 
than traditional civil remedies and the conciliated agreements are confidential.38  
 
Further, discrimination law remedies are victim oriented because their flexibility makes them 
more likely to be able to deal with the diverse forms of racial vilification.39 This strength is 
crudely evidenced by the 442 matters handled by the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination 
Board between October 1989 and 30 June 1994. 
 
Finally, the role of a body such as the Anti-Discrimination Commission also produces benefits. 
One such benefit is that it can use its influence to achieve a positive outcome where the 
complainant may not have been able to do so by themselves.40 Its specialised knowledge and the 
inevitable power of a government body can be a strong coercive force. A further benefit is that the 
Commission serves as a filter to prevent vexatious or frivolous claims.41 
 
2.2 Problems 
 
Discrimination law remedies are not without their flaws. One major problem is the confidential 
nature of conciliation as the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) requires that it must occur in 
                                            
30 s208(1) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
31 s208(1)(a) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
32 s208(1)(b) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
33 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 262. 
34 s209(1)(c) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). See also s209(5). 
35 As occurred in the recent HIV vilification decision in New South Wales. (The Courier Mail  20/9/96 at 9) 
36 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 262. 
37 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 54. 
38 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 260. Section 161 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) provides that 
conciliation must take place in private. 
39 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 54-5. 
40 Jones supra n.24 at 316-7. 
41 s138 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
private.42 This means that racial vilification becomes a private wrong relevant only to the parties.43 
The danger this presents is that it privatises justice and inhibits community education.44 This is 
especially problematic as racial vilification legislation is primarily aimed at public acts.45 
However, this problem may be partly overcome by agreements between the parties to publish an 
apology46 or by the Anti-Discrimination Commission anonymously publishing good news 
stories.47 Despite that, this concern is a legitimate one. 
 
Conciliation also presents difficulties with power imbalances between the parties.48 Often one of 
the parties to the dispute may be more vulnerable than the other. This may arise due to their status 
as an employee negotiating with their employer or alternatively it may arise because they are 
unable to easily express themselves in English. These factors and others may impair their ability to 
effectively negotiate to protect their needs. 
 
Although the Anti-Discrimination Commission officers can limit that imbalance through effective 
facilitation, it will always remain. However, conciliation can include negotiations that are more 
than just personal meetings. Often conciliation takes place with the facilitator “shuttling” between 
the parties. Further, provided the Commissioner consents, s163 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1991 (Qld) allows a complainant to be represented at conciliation by another person. In these 
cases where no personal meeting occurs, the possibility of a power imbalance is reduced. 
McNamara suggests that of those parties who do conciliate racial vilification disputes, less than 
half will actually meet.49 
 
Another criticism of discrimination law remedies is that their victim orientation places the burden 
of pursuing the claim on the victim.50 They must initiate the complaint and be responsible for its 
carriage. However, that may be justifiable considering that it is the victim who benefits from the 
resolution of the dispute. A final problem is a respondent may be subject to multiple complaints 
from people who all want different outcomes. In Queensland, possible solutions for this include 
the potential to bring representative complaints51 or to conduct the hearing of two or more 
complaints together.52 
 
Part 3: Rationale for Creating Criminal Offences Outlawing Racial 
Vilification in Queensland 
                                            
42 s161 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
43 This would be partly remedied by the public statement of condemnation made by criminal sanctions. 
44 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 55. 
45 Ibid. 
46 As occurred in the recent HIV vilification decision in New South Wales. (The Courier Mail  20/9/96 p9) 
47 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 260. 
48 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 56-7. 
49 Ibid at 57. Note that this is based only on preliminary data gathered by McNamara in New South Wales. However, 
it is consistent with a study conducted by R Hunter and A Leonard. (R Hunter and A Leonard The Outcomes of 
Conciliation in Sex Discrimination Cases, Working Paper No 8, Melbourne, Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, August 1995 at 14.) 
50 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 56. 
51 ss146 - 152 and ss194 - 200 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). 
52 Section 179 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) permits this provided the complaints arise out of 
substantially the same events. 
 
3.1 A Public Statement Condemning Racial Vilification 
 
Some writers have argued that racial vilification is an attitudinal problem and as such, legislation 
is an inappropriate response.53 However, it is clear that the law influences society’s moral 
standards.54 If the law takes a public stance condemning racial vilification then it will gradually 
persuade society that it is morally wrong and reduce its social acceptability.55  
 
A public statement of condemnation also openly values the victim as an important member of 
society who deserves protection.56 It would publicly recognise the victim’s hurt and provide 
justification for not having to tolerate vilification.57 
 
Criminalising racial vilification is necessary because civil remedies are less able to make this 
strong public statement of society’s condemnation.58  Civil offences deal only with private wrongs 
whereas imposing criminal sanctions means that it is society as a whole who has been wronged. 
Civil remedies, especially the discrimination law remedies advocated, have also become privatised 
so they are a less effective public statement.59 Finally, criminal sanctions are appropriate because 
they are traditionally used when society takes a more severe stance.60 
 
3.2 Protection of Victims 
 
Criminalisation of hate speech would also serve as a last line of defence to protect victims from 
serious racial vilification.61 In these severe cases, the discrimination law remedies are less likely to 
be effective as their emphasis is on conciliation which requires both parties’ cooperation. Even if 
the matter did go before the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, it too may not be appropriate as any 
civil sanctions it can order do not have the coercive force that criminal sanctions have.  
 
This means that to gain protection from serious vilification, the strength of the criminal law is 
required. Even if these criminal sanctions do not change the attitudes of racists or even deter 
them,62 they are necessary to protect the victims of severe vilification by establishing minimum 
standards of conduct.63 
                                            
53 For example, I Freckelton ‘Censorship and Vilification Legislation’ (1994) 1 AJHR  327. 
54 T Solomon ‘Problems in Drafting Legislation Against Racist Activities’ (1994) 1 AJHR 265 at 284; K Mahoney 
‘Hate Vilification Legislation and Freedom of Expression: Where is the Balance?’ (1994) 1 AJHR 353. 
55 Solomon supra n.52 at 284; Jones supra n.24 at 313-5. 
56 Jones supra n.24 at 315. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid at p313-5. To strengthen this public statement of condemnation, the criminal sanctions should be in the 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) rather than the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as is the case in New South Wales. 
(Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 262) 
59 Jones supra n.24 at 315. Under s161 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), all conciliation must take place in 
private. 
60 Jones supra n.24 at 314. 
61 Ibid at 314-5. 
62 However, this point is not conceded, especially in the long term. 
63 Jones supra n.24 at 314-5. As Martin Luther King said: “Judicial decrees may not change the heart but they restrain 
the heartless.” (cited in C Rubenstein ‘Legislating an End to Racism’ The Sydney Morning Herald 23/5/95 at 13). See 
also R v. Keegstra [1991] 2 WWR 1. This is a Canadian case that tested the constitutionality of s319(2) Criminal 
 
3.3 Problems 
 
The use of criminal sanctions against racial vilification has been heavily criticised in Australia. 
This was illustrated by the difficulties that the Commonwealth Government faced in passing its 
Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth). However, some of these criticisms misconstrue the role of the 
criminal law. One reason for this is that they falsely assume that racial vilification legislation must 
be either criminal offences or civil sanctions and not both. However, when these criticisms are 
evaluated in the context of the two purposes for criminalisation explored above and the 
availability of additional discrimination law remedies, their strength is weakened. Considered in 
this light, they do not significantly undermine the rationale for criminal sanctions. 
 
The major criticism of criminal sanctions is their inability to provide victims with adequate 
remedies.64 This criticism has some validity as the criminal law is relatively inflexible and pays 
little attention to any outcomes that the victim may want. Although tools such as victim statements 
may serve to improve that flexibility, they still do not entirely solve the problem. While this 
criticism is legitimate, it does fail to consider the true role of criminalisation65 and the ability of 
coexisting discrimination law remedies to meet the victims’ needs.66 
 
Other criticisms are that criminalising racial vilification may create martyrs or give racists a forum 
for their views.67 Although these are problems, a public conviction is important to make the 
statement of societal condemnation and to show racists that their views are wrong. Critics have 
also argued that criminalisation does not stop racism.68 Although this is probably true in the short 
term,69 this argument does not undermine the need for a public statement or to protect victims in 
extreme cases. Further, prevention is not a prerequisite to the criminalisation of other harmful acts. 
For example, making assault a crime does not stop people being beaten. However, criminalising 
assault is valid because it may be used to protect the victim from future assaults as well as making 
a public statement condemning the act. 
 
Freckelton attacks criminalisation on the basis that existing criminal sanctions for assault or 
damage to property are sufficient to deal with racially inspired crimes.70 However, to treat a 
specifically motivated crime under general provisions would undermine the strength of a public 
stance supporting victims of racial vilification. This argument is similar to the one that opposes 
                                                                                                                                               
Code (Can). Dickson CJC of the majority conceded that the Canadian criminal provisions were not able to rid society 
of all its racism. (at 73) However, he did find that the use of criminal prohibitions was an appropriate and acceptable 
means for furthering the important objective of preventing racial vilification. (at 79) 
64 L McNamara ‘Criminalising Racial Hatred: Learning from the Canadian Experience’ (1994) 1 AJHR 198 at 207-9. 
65 See Parts 3.1 and 3.2 above. 
66 This victim orientation of the discrimination law remedies is discussed above in Part 2.1. 
67 McNamara ‘Criminalising Racial Hatred: Learning from the Canadian Experience’ supra n.61 at 206-7; Freckelton 
supra n.51 at 343-5, 349. For example, in Canada, a convicted racist called Keegstra is still in the papers ten years 
after being charged. 
68 F Brennan ‘Law Won’t Soften the Hearts of Racists’ The Australian 12/8/94 at 13; Freckelton supra n.51 at 340-1; 
R v. Keegstra [1991] 2 WWR 1 at 111 per McLachlin J of the minority. 
69 It was argued in Part 3.1 that the law can change society. However, this clearly takes time and may occur over 
decades. 
70 Freckelton supra n.51 at 333-4. 
moves to make the offence of rape gender neutral. It argues that treating a specific crime generally 
obscures the true nature of the offence. 
 
Freckelton also argues that Australia does not have a sufficiently serious racial vilification 
problem to justify criminalisation.71 He limits the problem to “pockets of unpleasant racism” and 
says that by world standards Australia is very harmonious.72 This view is contrary to the majority 
of other writers.73 It is also contrary to the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Australian Law Reform Commission 
Reference on Multiculturalism and the Law which all noted concerning levels of racism. In addition, 
recent developments such as the level of support for Pauline Hanson, have also highlighted the racism 
within Australia. 
 
Further, Freckelton is concerned that criminalisation is more likely to restrict the freedom of 
speech than civil remedies.74 While this is probably true, the freedom of speech has always been 
subject to reasonable restrictions. For example, obscenity, blackmail and defamation all limit the 
freedom of speech but have been judged by society to be reasonable.75 In addition, the New South 
Wales experience over the past eight years has shown that criminalising racial vilification does not 
unduly limit the freedom of speech. Although there would have been some limitation,76 Hennessy and 
Smith believe that it has not been significant.77 There has been some criticism of the New South 
Wales Act but Hennessy and Smith argue that a lot of it has stemmed from ignorance or selectively 
cited evidence.78 
 
One legitimate concern of criminalisation of racial vilification is that it removes the hate speech 
from its context. Because only serious cases would be prosecuted, a public statement is subtlely 
made that any vilification of a less serious nature is “normal” racism and therefore justified.79 This 
presents a real concern as it undermines the educational aspect of criminalisation’s public 
statement. 
 
Part 4: The Relationship Between Criminal and Civil Sanctions 
 
Having highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of both criminal and civil sanctions, it is 
important to explain the proposed relationship between them. The first step in almost every case 
will be to use the discrimination law remedies. As outlined in Part 2, they provide the most 
flexible and victim oriented solutions and so are best suited to solving the real issues that victims 
face. Such an approach will be appropriate in the vast majority of cases. 
                                            
71 Ibid at 335-8. 
72 Ibid at 338. 
73 For example, Mahoney supra n.52 at 354-6; Solomon supra n.52 at 267-71; McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial 
Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 40-3. 
74 Freckelton supra n.51 at 338-9. 
75 The constitutionally implied freedom of political speech and its qualifications is another example of where 
reasonable restrictions have been placed on free speech. However, a full discussion of the implied freedom’s 
implications for racial vilification is beyond the scope of this paper. 
76 That is, after all, the aim of the legislation. 
77 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 264. 
78 McNamara ‘The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech’ supra n.23 at 43. 
79 McNamara ‘Criminalising Racial Hatred: Learning from the Canadian Experience’ supra n.62 at 207-8. 
 
However, in very severe cases, as explained in Part 3, the discrimination law remedies are likely 
to be ineffective. It is in these few cases that the criminal sanctions will be used. For example, the 
criminal law would be used to deal with a repeat offender who refuses to stop their hate speech or 
a racist who makes threats of physical harm on racial grounds. In these cases, criminal sanctions 
will provide the last line of protection for victims where other remedies would fail. Further, in 
these serious cases, the public statement of condemnation made by criminal sanctions is 
particularly appropriate. 
 
This is similar to the approach taken in New South Wales with its combination of criminal and 
civil sanctions. Although the confidential nature of conciliated outcomes makes the New South 
Wales legislation difficult to assess, Hennessy and Smith suggest that it has been reasonably 
successful.80 Between October 1989 and 30 June 1994, the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination 
Board handled 442 complaints using discrimination law remedies. A few cases were referred for 
criminal prosecution to the Director of Public Prosecutions but it was decided not to proceed. 
These statistics show how some of the concerns about creating criminal offences that were 
highlighted in Part 3 are overstated. 
 
This can be contrasted with the situation in Canada where reliance is placed on the criminal law 
and little use is made of their discrimination law remedies. Canada has been unsuccessful in 
combating racial vilification using criminal sanctions with the laws being infrequently enforced 
and failing to satisfy the victim’s needs.81 This supports the contention that Queensland’s focus 
must remain on the discrimination law remedies with the criminal law playing a subsidiary and 
supporting role. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Queensland's current hate speech provision, s126 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), is 
inadequate so an improved legislative response is needed. An important part of that reform is enacting 
racial vilification legislation that contains both criminal and civil sanctions.  
 
As each type of sanction has a different purpose, a comprehensive legislative response requires both. 
Civil sanctions based on discrimination law remedies provide victims with flexible solutions that meet 
their needs. It is these remedies that will be used in almost every case. However, the limited support of 
criminal sanctions is also necessary. They make a strong public statement condemning racial 
vilification and also protect victims from severe hate speech where discrimination law remedies 
would fail. 
 
Queensland’s racial vilification legislation must contain both criminal and civil sanctions. If it fails to 
do this, then we as a society are not providing the best protection that we can for the victims of hate 
speech. 
 
 
                                            
80 Hennessy and Smith supra n.23 at 263. 
81 Ibid. 
 
